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Abstract
All trust management systems must take into account the possibility of error: of misplaced trust. Therefore,
regardless of whether it uses reputation or not, is centralized or distributed, a trust management system
must be evaluated with consideration for the consequences of misplaced or abused trust. Thus, the issue of
fairness has always been implicitly considered in the design and evaluation of trust management systems.
This paper attempts to show that an implicit consideration, using the utilitarian paradigm of maximizing the
sum of agents’ utilities, is insuﬃcient. Two case studies presented in the paper concern the design of a new
reputation systems that uses implicit and emphasized negative feedbacks, and the evaluation of reputation
systems’ robustness to discrimination. The case studies demonstrate that considering fairness explicitly
leads to diﬀerent trust management system design and evaluation. Trust management systems can realize
a goal of system fairness, identiﬁed with distributional fairness of agents’ utilities. The realization of this
goal can be achieved in a laboratory setting when all other factors that aﬀect utilities can be excluded, and
where the system can be tested using modeled adversaries. Taking the fairness of agent behavior explicitly
into account when building trust or distrust can help to realize the goal of fairness of trust management
systems.
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1 Introduction
In distributed, open systems, where the behavior of autonomous agents is uncertain
and can aﬀect other agents’ welfare, trust management is widely used to allow
agents to determine what to expect about the behavior of other agents. Examples
of practical use of trust management are (among others) reputation systems in
online auctions and Peer-to-Peer ﬁle sharing systems.
This paper is concerned with the evaluation of trust management systems. Such
systems must always take into account the possibility of error: of misplaced or
abused trust. Therefore, the evaluation of trust management systems always should
consider the consequences of such errors for the welfare or utility of users (au-
tonomous agents that use the trust management system). The main claim of this
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paper is that fairness should be explicitly taken into account in the evaluation of
trust management systems. This claim is analyzed using two case studies that
concern trust management systems that use reputation.
Reputation systems have usually been studied in one of two ways: by considering
the real, economic or social impact of their practical applications (such as auction
systems) [13] or by the use of simulation. New reputation systems are usually
studied by simulation [3,8,9]. In this approach, the agent interaction is frequently
modeled as a game, and a powerful paradigm prevails in such research. This is the
utilitarian paradigm, originating from research on the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Follow-
ing the work of Axelrod [7], a large body of research has considered the emergence
of cooperation (according to ”Science”, this is one of the 25 most important open
scientiﬁc problems 2 ). The introduction of reputation has been demonstrated as
helpful to the emergence of cooperation .
In the Prisoner’s Dilemma, the sum of payoﬀs of two agents is highest when
both agents cooperate. This fact makes it possible to use the sum of payoﬀs as
a measure of cooperation in the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. This method is an
utilitarian approach to the evaluation of reputation systems [3,14,16]. A reputation
system is therefore considered successful (in most research) when the sum of utilities
of all agents in the distributed system is highest. A notable exception is the work
of Dellarocas [8]. Note that the utilitarian paradigm is used even if the simulation
uses a more complex model of agent interaction than the Prisoner’s Dilemma. A
similar approach can be used in the evaluation of trust management systems that
do not use reputation.
When considering the rationale of a trust management system using common
sense, it seems that this approach is clearly inadequate. A trust management system
that increases the sum of utilities of all agents does not consider whether, and to
what extent, agents have been cheated (because of misplaced or abused trust). It
is perfectly possible that a minority of agents is constantly being cheated, while
the sum of utilities remains high. It is also possible that the sum of all utilities is
high, but the variation of these utilities is also high. Evaluating trust management
algorithms using the utilitarian approach disregards the fairness of all agents in the
system. The reason for the adoption of this approach by previous research is not a
deﬁnition of trust or trust management objectives that disregards fairness, but the
lack of knowledge about computationally tractable methods for fairness evaluation.
This paper presents a case for the consideration of fairness of reputation and
trust management systems. The main contribution of this paper lies in the presen-
tation of a new, practical method for consideration fairness of trust management
systems. The proposed method is based on a strong theoretical foundation: the
theory of equity. The paper demonstrates that the proposed method can lead to
diﬀerent designs of reputation algorithms and that it is a useful criterion in the
evaluation of reputation systems. In short: considering fairness is possible and can
2 ”Science”, July 2005, special issue: ”125 Questions: What Don’t We Know?”,
http://www.sciencemag.org/sciext/125th/ However, note that the existence of reputation informa-
tion is a modiﬁcation of the original Prisoner’s Dilemma. Axelrod has explicitly ruled out the existence of
reputation information in his deﬁnition of the game.
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The Lorenz Curve Two incomparable distributions
Fig. 1. Examples of Lorenz curves
make a diﬀerence for the design of trust management or reputation systems.
The fairness evaluation method described in section 2 can be used in simulation
of any trust management system, given that the utilities of agents are deﬁned. To
demonstrate that the proposed method can be used in practice for consideration
of fairness, two case studies are presented. The ﬁrst study (section 3) concerns
the evaluation of a new reputation algorithm, while the second study (section 4) is
devoted to the robustness of a simple reputation algorithm to discrimination. The
paper concludes with a discussion concerning the relationship of fairness and trust.
2 Evaluating Fairness Based on Theory of Equity
In order to consider fairness in the evaluation of trust management system, it is
necessary to deﬁne fairness. In this section, the concept of fairness will be discussed
and deﬁned in an abstract manner. The next two sections will demonstrate how
fairness can be used in practice to evaluate reputation systems and algorithms.
Fairness can be deﬁned as a property of the behavior of individual agents or of a
system. The behavior of agents can be called fair if it does not violate the contract,
agreement or norms that govern the behavior of all agents in a system. The behavior
of a system is fair if it promotes fair behavior of all agents in the system and results
in a fair distribution of utilities of agents. In this work, the concept of system
fairness is identiﬁed with distributive fairness, a sense narrower than social justice
[10]. Distributive fairness is usually related to the question of distribution of some
goods, resources or costs, be it kidneys for transplantation, parliament mandates,
or the costs of water and electricity. Although extensively studied [11], fairness is a
complex concept that depends much on cultural values, precedents, and the context
of the problem. Therefore, a precise and computationally tractable deﬁnition is
needed to use it in research.
Distributive fairness can be based on an axiomatic expression and can be ex-
pressed as a multicriteria optimization problem using theory of equity (this deﬁni-
tion is also referred to as equitable optimization [12]). The axioms of the theory of
equity which formulate a relation of preference on the outcome vectors of a multicri-
teria decision problem (these outcomes can be the utilities of agents in a distributed
system). Let y = [y1, ..., yn] be such an outcome vector (assuming there are n agents
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that maximize their utilities). An equitable rational preference relation is any sym-
metric and transitive relation satisfying the following axioms (see [12] for formal
deﬁnitions):
symmetry The ordering of the outcome values is ignored (e.g. a solution y =
[4, 2, 0] is equally good as a solution y = [0, 2, 4]).
monotony A outcome improving the value of one of the objectives is preferred,
the values of other objectives are not deteriorated (e.g. y = [4, 2, 0] is preferred to
y = [3, 2, 0]).
principle of transfers A transfer of any small amount from an outcome to any
other relatively worse-oﬀ outcome results in a more preferred outcome vector (e.g.
y = [3, 2, 1] is preferred to y = [4, 2, 0]).
The above axioms are suﬃcient to compare two outcome vectors on the basis of
theory of equity, to determine whether they are equitably equivalent, or whether one
of them is preferred to another. For instance, consider the two vectors: y1 = [5, 5, 10]
and y2 = [2, 2, 2]. It can be seen that by applying the axiom of monotony, vector y1
is equitably preferred to y2. This example demonstrates that the theory of equity
is not about equality : vector y2 has an equal distribution of outcomes, but it is
considered worse, because in outcome y1, all agents are better oﬀ. On the other
hand, the two vectors: [2, 4, 8] and [2, 5, 6] are equitably incomparable: none of them
can be preferred to the other.
However, the theory of equity can also be simply graphically described. The left
part of Figure 1 shows one of the key concepts of distributive fairness: the Lorenz
curve (to use its name from economics). The Lorenz curve is obtained by ﬁrst taking
the outcomes of all agents that participate in a distribution and ordering them from
worse to best. Then, the ordered outcomes are added one at a time, creating a
sequence of cumulative sums, called cumulative ordered sums. Let us denote this
operation by a vector function θ(−→y ) = [θ1(−→y ), ..., θn(−→y )] of the outcome vector.
Then, the cumulative ordered sums of agents’ utilities are calculated: starting from
the utility of the worst agent (θ1), then the sum of utilities of the worst and the
second worst (θ2), and so on, until the sum of all agents’ utilities, which is denoted
on the ﬁgure as θn. The second line on the ﬁgure, the equal distribution line, is
simply a straight line connecting the points (1, θ1) and (n, θn). The area between
the two curves, denoted by S, can be seen as a measure of inequality of the agent’s
utilities. The objective of distributive fairness is to minimize this inequality, making
the Lorenz curve as close to the equal distribution line as possible. Note that this
objective frequently forms a tradeoﬀ with the objective of maximizing the total sum
of agents utilities (θn). The right part of Figure 1 shows two Lorenz curves that
correspond to diﬀerent distributions among the same agents. The ﬁrst distribution
has a higher θn, but also a higher inequality, while the second distribution has a
lower total of agents’ utilities, but is more fair. In terms of equitable optimization,
the two distributions on the right side of Figure 1 are incomparable - the choice of
one of them depends on the preferences of a decision maker.
Without a detailed discussion, let us state that the theory of equity allows for
the formulation of fairness objectives as a multicriteria optimization problem, and
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that this transformation relies on the operation θ of ordering and then creating
cumulative ordered sums. (The Pareto-optimal solutions of the multicriteria prob-
lem obtained by performing cumulative ordered sums of the criteria of the original
problem are equitably optimal solutions of the original problem.) Therefore, the
Lorenz curve actually represents the criteria that need to be optimized in order to
achieve equitably eﬃcient (fair) solutions. These criteria are the cumulative sums
of 1, 2, ..., k worst outcomes. Note also that according to the theory of equity, the
utilitarian approach is a special case: optimizing the sum of agent’s utilities also
leads to an equitably eﬃcient solution. However, this solution is one of many and it
is up to the decision maker (the designer of a trust management system) to make a
choice of one solution. At the other extreme, the solution obtained by equalizing the
outcomes of all agents is also equitably eﬃcient. The interested reader is referred
to [12].
The area between the Lorenz curve and the equal distribution line can be simply
calculated and used as a computable measure of inequality. It can be shown that
minimizing this measure leads to fair distributions [12]. The Gini coeﬃcient (fre-
quently used in economics) is the area S normalized by θn: Gini = 2Sθn . Note that
minimizing the Gini coeﬃcient to obtain fair distributions can lead to worse total
outcomes (sums of all agent’s utilities) - this drawback can be overcome when the
problem of distributive fairness is formulated as a multicriteria problem. Solving
such a problem means ﬁnding a set of Pareto-optimal solutions and choosing one
of them that best suits the preferences of a decision maker (which are expressed as
additional input to the problem). The decision maker can then choose whether he
prefers increasing equality at the cost of decreasing the total outcome, or not.
Such a deﬁnition can be applied in the study of reputation or trust management
systems in a laboratory setting, where other factors that aﬀect agent’s utilities can
be excluded because they inﬂuence all agents equally (this is equivalent to the ceteris
paribus assumption used in economics). In a real environment, a trust management
system would interact with agents that have diverse resources, abilities and moti-
vation, and therefore the deﬁnition of fairness would become much more diﬃcult.
However, the study of trust management systems usually begins in a laboratory
where the conditions required for consideration of fairness can be satisﬁed.
3 First Case: a New Reputation Algorithm
The ﬁrst case study that demonstrates the consideration of fairness in the design and
evaluation of trust management systems is devoted to a new reputation algorithm
that has been developed for online auctions. The algorithm is an extension of the
simple algorithm used by eBay by taking into account a new type of feedback: the so
called ”implicit feedback” [9], and additionally the algorithm is capable of stressing
the importance of explicit negative feedbacks. The consideration of fairness has
inﬂuenced the design of this algorithm.
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3.1 The algorithm of implicit and stressed negative feedbacks
Most online auction sites use a simple feedback-based reputation system [13]. Typi-
cally, parties involved in a transaction mutually post feedbacks after the transaction
is committed. Each transaction can be judged as ’positive’, ’neutral ’, or ’negative’.
The reputation of a user is simply the number of distinct partners providing posi-
tive feedbacks minus the number of distinct partners providing negative feedbacks
(possibly normalized by the number of all distinct partners). As pointed out in
[14], such a simple reputation system suﬀers from numerous deﬁciencies, including
the subjective nature of feedbacks and the lack of transactional and social contexts.
Yet another drawback of feedback-based reputation systems is that these systems do
not account for psychological motivation of users. Many users refrain from posting
a neutral or negative feedback in fear of retaliation, thus biasing the system into
assigning overestimated reputation scores. This phenomenon is manifested by high
asymmetry in feedbacks collected after auctions and, equally importantly, by high
number of auctions with no feedback provided. Many of these missing feedbacks
may convey implicit and unvoiced assessments of poor seller’s performance which
should be included in the computation of a seller’s reputation.
As described in [9], there can be many ways of identifying implicit feedbacks
in a real-world reputation system, based on the observation of behavioral patterns.
To evaluate the eﬀectiveness of using implicit feedback, we have identiﬁed a simpler
reputation algorithm that can be simulated and compared to the algorithm of most
Internet auction houses.
If a user decides to post a negative feedback in spite of the negative incentives
involved, it is probable that the user is very dissatisﬁed with his contractor. For that
reason, his negative feedback should perhaps have a higher impact on reputation
than an ordinary positive feedback. We shall refer this method as stressing of
negative feedbacks.
Consider a user u with a history of n auctions. Let us assume that only m ≤ n
of these auctions have a feedback. Out of these m feedbacks m+ are positive or
neutral feedbacks (in practice, the amount of neutral feedbacks can be ignored),
m− are negative feedbacks, while m∗ = n −m is the amount of missing feedbacks
(transactions that had no feedback). Thus, m+ ≤ m ≤ n. The reputation ρu of the
user u will be calculated as follows:
ρu =
m+
αm∗ + m+ + (1 + β)m−
where 0 ≤ α, β ≤ 1. Thus, if α = β = 0, the above reputation score becomes
a simple ratio of the number of positive feedbacks received by the user u. In the
case when the user has had no auctions, the above formula is undeﬁned. In such
case we set the reputation ρu to an initial value, ρ0. The two coeﬃcients have
the following complementary roles: α is used to control the importance of implicit
negative feedbacks, and β controls the stress that is placed on explicit negative
feedbacks.
To be precise, in our simulations we use a slightly more complex version of
the above algorithm. Since agents in the simulator choose whom they want to
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interact with on the basis of reputation scores, it is necessary to avoid that the
reputation would drop suddenly to a low level. This can happen in the initial phase
of the simulation, when the reputation score has not yet stabilized (initially, a single
negative feedback could decrease the initial reputation by a large degree). Therefore,
we use a simple moving average to smooth reputation changes. The smoothed
reputation ρmau (t) = 0.5ρ
ma
u (t − 1) + ρu(t), where t is time, and ρmau (0) = ρ0(the
smoothed reputation is initialized by the initial reputation value). Note that over
time, the impact of the initial reputation decreases exponentially.
3.2 The simulator
In the design of the simulator, we had to make a decision about a suﬃciently re-
alistic, yet not too complex model of the auction system, of user behavior, and of
the reputation system. We chose to simulate the reputation system almost totally
faithfully (the only simpliﬁcation is that we use only positive and negative feed-
backs). The behavior of a user is also quite realistic: the user can take into account
reputation when choosing a business partner. The user also decides whether she
wishes to report or not, depending on the type of feedback. Users can cheat in
feedbacks, as well as in transactions. Users may also use transaction strategies that
depend on the history of their individual interactions, as well as on the reputation
value of the other participant.
The auction system, on the other hand, has been simpliﬁed. We consider that
it was not necessary to simulate the entire auction process; rather, we simulate the
selection of users using random choice of a set o potential sellers. The choosing user
(the buyer) selects one of the sellers that has the highest reputation in the set. The
transaction itself has also been simpliﬁed: the simulator could use the Prisoner’s
Dilemma or a zero-sum game.
In our simulator, a number of agents that represent users interact with each
other. The reputation system is maintained by a reputation server that is also used
to summarize the outcomes of agent interactions (user transactions). Each agent is
described by the following parameters: r+, the probability that an agent will send
a feedback if it is positive; r−, the probability that an agent will send a feedback
if it is not positive; the chosen game strategy; the reputation threshold ρmin that
is used by some strategies; and the probability of cheating c that is used by some
strategies. We can specify a number of agents and every agent can have distinct
parameters. However, we usually partition all agents into two sets that have the
same parameters, called the honest and dishonest agents.
The two game strategies used in the simulations described in this paper are: to
cheat with the probability c, or to play Tit-for-Tat with a reputation threshold ρmin.
Tit-for-tat is a famous strategy for the iterated PD game that has been proposed
by Rapaport. This strategy works simply by repeating the move made by the other
agent in a previous encounter. If two agents meet for the ﬁrst time, the classic Tit-
for-tat strategy always cooperates, allowing the agents to start an unending pattern
of honest transactions. We modify Tit-for-tat to use a reputation threshold: if two
agents meet for the ﬁrst time and the second agents’ reputation is below ρmin, the
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ﬁrst agent defects.
The server can compute reputations using all available feedbacks and using any
implemented algorithm. The results of the simulation include: the reputations of
individual agents and the total payoﬀs (from all transactions) of all agents. The
payoﬀs are aﬀected by the way the reputation system works: for example, if agents
send very few feedbacks, reputations will be random and the payoﬀs of good agents
will drop. The simulator allows to check whether the implemented reputation algo-
rithms are eﬀective.
To verify the concept of implicit and stressed negative feedbacks, we have im-
plemented the reputation algorithm described above. User feedback behavior was
simulated in one of two ways: either all agents always posted feedback truthfully
(perfect feedback), or agents posted feedback according to the following rule (poor
feedback). If the feedback was positive, an agent would post it with probabil-
ity r+ = 0.6, and if the feedback was not positive, the agent would post it with
probability r+ = 0.05. All feedbacks were always true, if they were posted. The
parameters of poor feedback behavior were observed from the analysis of traces
obtained from a Polish Internet auction house. The traces contained over 650000
committed auctions made by a sample group of 10000 buyers over a period of six
months. While it is clear that the posting behavior of real users is more complex,
this approximation is suﬃcient to evaluate the possibility of using implicit feedback
in a simple reputation algorithm.
The algorithm was evaluated using the following simulation scenarios. There
were 300 simulated agents that were divided into two sets: the honest agents and
the dishonest agents. Honest agents were 90% of all agents, and the remaining agents
were dishonest. An honest agent used the Tit-for-Tat strategy with a reputation
threshold of ρmin = 0.5. A dishonest agent used a strategy of random cheating with
probability c = 0.6. All agents used poor feedback or perfect feedback, depending
on the scenario. In all simulations, 40000 auctions were simulated.
Together, there have been three signiﬁcant simulation scenarios: perfect feed-
back with reputation calculated using a simple ratio of positive feedbacks (a repu-
tation algorithm like described in the previous section, only with α = β = 0); poor
reports with a simple ratio; and poor reports with the reputation algorithm that
uses implicit and stressed negative feedbacks, with diﬀerent settings for α and β.
All experiments were conducted using the Monte-Carlo method. We present
average results from 10 simulation runs, together with 95% conﬁdence intervals of
results (intervals for which with probability of 95%, all results would belong to the
interval. Conﬁdence intervals were obtained using the t-Student distribution). The
outcomes of every simulation were the average payoﬀs and the Gini coeﬃcients of
honest and dishonest agents.
3.3 Considering fairness in algorithm evaluation
We evaluate the eﬀectiveness of a reputation system using the following criteria:
the average payoﬀ of a good agent, the average payoﬀ of a bad agent, and the Gini
coeﬃcient of the payoﬀs of the good agents. The last criterion was introduced as a
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Fig. 2. Average Gini coeﬃcient of honest agents
way of evaluating the eﬀectiveness of the reputation system in providing fairness of
the treatment of good agents.
The objective of the evaluation was to choose a good value of the parameters α
and β for the reputation algorithm. Choosing low values of α and β would result
in an algorithm that behaved almost like the simple ratio of positive feedbacks.
Choosing high values of α would decrease the reputation of agents that persistently
had many missing feedbacks. The eﬀect of these implicit negative feedbacks could
become stronger than the ratio of positive feedbacks, and could decrease the repu-
tations of users too much (bias the reputation in another direction). On the other
hand, increasing β may become dangerous if agents can send false negative reports.
The results of algorithm evaluation are shown on Figures 2 and 3. The ﬁgures
show results in the poor feedback scenario for diﬀerent values of α: 0, 0.05, 0.1, 0.2,
and 0.4, and for β = 0.05. The eﬀect of increasing β will be described later - ﬁrst,
let us consider the eﬀect of varying α .
Figure 2 shows the eﬀect of varying α on the Gini coeﬃcient. Each point shows
the average Gini coeﬃcient and its conﬁdence intervals. Figure 3 shows the payoﬀs
of good (top curve) and bad agents (bottom curve). Both ﬁgures also show results
for perfect feedback that were used as reference levels. These values are shown as
straight dashed horizontal lines labeled ”perfect”.
Values obtained for α = 0 show the performance of a simple reputation algorithm
that does not use implicit feedback (but slightly stresses explicit negative feedbacks)
under the poor feedback scenario. Recall that the parameters for the poor feedback
scenario correspond to real-world data, and therefore these results approximate a
realistic performance of an algorithm such as used by most Internet auction houses.
Comparing these results to the perfect reference levels, it can be noticed that while
the average payoﬀ of honest agents decreases slightly, the average payoﬀ of dishonest
agents increases by over 100%. This is an indication of how easy it is for dishonest
agents to exploit the poor quality of feedbacks in a simple reputation system. These
A. Wierzbicki / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 197 (2008) 73–89 81
Fig. 3. Average payoﬀs of honest and dishonest agents
results also show that the average or total payoﬀ of good agents can be a poor
indicator of the volume of fraudulent transactions.
Increasing the value of α demonstrates the eﬀectiveness of using implicit feed-
back. Even for very small α = 0.05, the average payoﬀ of dishonest agents drops
dramatically, almost back to the ”perfect” reference level. The average payoﬀ of
honest agents increases slowly with the increase of α. The average payoﬀ of dis-
honest agents decreased continually with the increase of α, dropping almost to the
level obtained for perfect feedback. The average payoﬀ of honest agents increased
for α < 0.3; for higher α, the average payoﬀ of honest agents began to decrease
slightly. Table 1 shows 95% conﬁdence intervals for the average payoﬀs of honest
agents (row PHCI ) and for values of the Gini coeﬃcient of all honest agents (row
Fig. 4. Eﬀect of stressing negative feedbacks’
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P 0 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.4
PHCI 186,2-187,4 176,9-178,8 181,6-183,1 181,9-183,3 182,1-183,6 179,4-183,2
GHCI 0,14-0,15 0,05-0,06 0,15-0,17 0,16-0,17 0,16-0,17 0,17-0,19
Table 1
95% conﬁdence intervals for payoﬀs and Gini coeﬃcients
GHCI ). The conﬁdence intervals were obtained from samples of 10 simulation runs.
The same conﬁdence intervals are also shown on the ﬁgures in the form of vertical
lines around the data points. The column labeled P describes the perfect feedback
scenario, while the other columns describe the poor feedback scenario with diﬀerent
values of α and for β = 0.05. Note that the average payoﬀ of honest agents changes
very little with the variation of α above 0.05. The Gini coeﬃcient is more sensitive
to changes of α. The sharp increase of the Gini coeﬃcient when α is increased from
0 to 0.05 is due to the fact that when implicit feedbacks are not taken into account,
honest agents are worse oﬀ, but the distribution of agents utilities can be more even.
The Gini coeﬃcient should therefore not be used as a single criterion, but rather
jointly with the total utility or a similar criterion.
On the basis of the average payoﬀs alone, a designer of the reputation system
would choose a value of α = 0.2, or even α = 0.4. Larger values of α lead to
an increased penalty of dishonest agents, and the average payoﬀ of good agents is
largest for α = 0.2.
However, consideration of the Gini coeﬃcient shows clearly that increasing α
leads to an increased inequality in the treatment of agents. This may be due to
the fact that agent reputation becomes more variable due to the additional eﬀect
of missing feedbacks that depends on random variables. Reputation is no longer
dependent on agent behavior alone. The optimal value of α, when considering the
Gini coeﬃcients alone, is α = 0. Unfortunately, this value results in very poor levels
for the other criteria. Therefore, a system designer that would consider all criteria
jointly would probably choose α = 0.05.
The eﬀect of increasing β is demonstrated on Figure 4. The ﬁgure shows again
the relationship of average payoﬀs of bad agents, and α. However, the ﬁgure shows
three lines that have been obtained from varying β. As β increases, the average
payoﬀ of bad agents drops for all values of α. The eﬀect is apparent for small values
of β; as β exceeds 0.1, it stops having the eﬀect of decreasing payoﬀs of bad agents,
while at the same time it strongly increases the Gini coeﬃcient of good agents. Also,
the risk of exploiting false explicit negative feedbacks for coalition attacks increases
with higher values of β. Therefore, we have limited our study to small values of β.
Concluding, the ﬁrst case study demonstrates the eﬀectiveness of a new reputa-
tion algorithm that uses implicit and stressed negative feedbacks. However, implicit
and stressed negative feedbacks are a dangerous tool that must be used carefully.
Increasing their weight in a reputation algorithm may result in penalizing honest
agents along with dishonest agents, or in increasing the risk of coalition attacks.
This deﬁciency is most clearly demonstrated when one considers the distributive
fairness of honest agents’ payoﬀs in a laboratory setting, where all other factors
that inﬂuence payoﬀs can be excluded.
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Discrimination Cooperation
Average payoﬀ of old agents 86612 84753
96% conﬁdence interval 82223-91001 83864-85642
Table 2
Old agents’ payoﬀs in the ﬁrst simulation
4 Second Case: Robustness of Reputation Systems
The second case study concerns the evaluation of a simple reputation system’s re-
sistance to discrimination attacks. In research on reputation systems, the adversary
model usually permits collaboration of adversaries. This collaboration frequently
takes the form of a coalition that attempts to inﬂuence reputation scores. Dis-
crimination is another form of adversary behavior; the adversary need not form an
explicit coalition with a single goal, but is allowed to distinguish agents belonging
to two or more groups. The adversary can treat one agents from one group fairly,
while cheating other agents. Discrimination has been studied, among others, by
Dellarocas [8].
In this case study we consider an open market, where a number of agents trades
some goods. The majority of agents on the market belong to one group, called
the old agents. Newcomers constantly enter the market, but they usually form a
minority group, called the new agents. Old agents usually trade fairly with other
old agents, but they also usually cheat new agents. New agents usually act fairly
(at least initially). They can leave the market any time if their losses are too high,
or - after a time - they may join the group of old agents.
We have chosen to simulate a steady state of the described market, where a con-
stant proportion of agents are new agents. The processes of entering and leaving
the market and of joining the group of old agents have been left out of the sim-
ulation. It has been our goal to answer the following questions: is discrimination
proﬁtable for old agents? Can the reputation system protect against discrimination?
And how can we evaluate the eﬀectiveness of the reputation system in preventing
discrimination?
In our case study we have used the same simulator as described in the previous
section. We have simulated 100 agents, out of which 30 were new agents. The agents
executed 20000 transactions that have been modeled using the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
Therefore, the maximum total payoﬀ of all agents was equal to 120000. As in the
previous study, the presented results were obtained from 10 simulation runs. Unlike
New agents Old agents
Average reputation 30 75
95% conﬁdence interval 26-34 72-78
Table 3
Reputations of old and new agents under discrimination
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Discrimination Cooperation
Average total payoﬀ 107848 107833
Average Gini 0,65 0,53
Table 4
Total payoﬀs and the Gini coeﬃcient in the second simulation
the previous study, we have always simulated perfect feedback behavior.
In the ﬁrst simulation, there were two scenarios. In the cooperation scenario
all agents (new and old) always cooperated with each other. The results of this
scenario are used as reference levels for comparison. In the discrimination scenario,
all new agents used the Reputation Tit-for-tat strategy, and all old agents used a
new strategy of discrimination: they always cooperated with old agents and always
cheated new agents. The results of the ﬁrst simulation enabled us to answer the
ﬁrst two questions. The average total payoﬀs of old agents are presented on Table 2.
The distribution of total payoﬀs was shifter towards the larger end of the conﬁdence
interval.
In this case, old agents are indeed better oﬀ using discrimination: in other words,
it sometimes pays oﬀ to cheat.
What happened to the reputation system? Table 3 shows the average reputation
of new and old agents under the discrimination scenario. Paradoxically, the repu-
tation of new (”honest”) agents is only 30, while the reputation of old (”cheating”)
agents is as high as 75. This is explained by the fact that when new agents retaliate
against cheating old agents, they receive negative feedback. All agents used perfect
feedback, and the new agents were a minority forced to retaliate against a majority
of old agents. On the other hand, old agents only cheat a minority and maintain a
high reputation by cooperating with each other. In this case, the reputation system
did not protect honest agents; it acted against them.
The ﬁrst simulation used an extreme case when the detection of discrimination
is simple. Old agents always discriminate against new agents, and as a result, the
total payoﬀ of all agents decreases noticeably. However, discrimination can be more
subtle. What if old agents discriminate only sometimes? What if new agents cheat
sometimes, too? In such a case, how do we evaluate whether discrimination was
prevented by the reputation system?
To answer the question of how to detect discrimination and how to evaluate
the eﬀectiveness of the reputation system in preventing discrimination, the second
simulation used two scenarios. In the discrimination scenario, old agents always
discriminate; but in the second scenario of no discrimination, all agents cheat with
the same probability of c = 0.24. The results are summarized on Table 4. It
turns out that using the total payoﬀ of all agents, the two scenarios are almost
indistinguishable (the diﬀerence in total payoﬀs is about 0.01%). On the other
hand, the Gini coeﬃcients of all agents’ payoﬀs diﬀer widely in the two scenarios.
This is due to the fact that under the discrimination scenario, the distribution of
agents’ payoﬀs is much less fair than under the scenario of no discrimination.
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The second case study demonstrates that when adversaries are allowed to dis-
criminate other agents, fairness becomes an even larger issue in reputation systems.
Taking fairness into consideration may also help to evaluate the extent of discrimi-
nation in a laboratory setting, and to determine whether a reputation system eﬀec-
tively protects against discrimination.
5 Conclusion
The two case studies have demonstrated that fairness can be taken into account in
the evaluation of trust management systems in a laboratory setting. Considering
fairness leads to diﬀerent design of reputation algorithms, and fairness is a useful
criterion in the evaluation of reputation systems. However, the consideration of
fairness is based on a premise that whenever possible, trust management systems
should be designed to provide fair treatment of their users. We would like to go
one step further and open a discussion of the questions: should fairness be a goal
of trust management systems? If so, how can this goal be achieved in practice?
The ﬁrst question raises some concerns. In a real-world setting, users of trust
management systems would be expected to have quite varied levels of utility (per-
haps even incomparable ones). How, then, do we expect a trust management system
to realize a goal of fairness?
This concern is based on a frequent misconception that mistakes equality for
fairness. If a trader in an Internet auction house has better goods, provides better
services and has better marketing than other traders, it is perfectly fair that he
should have a larger transaction volume and a larger revenue. In fact, his reputa-
tion should increase, as well, so the trust management system should in this case
support him in getting even more trade. On the other hand, if we have two traders
that have comparable goods, services, and marketing, yet they have very unequal
reputation and transaction volumes, surely something is wrong in the way the trust
management system works.
Therefore, when all other factors can be excluded, fairness can be identiﬁed with
distributional fairness and the concept of equity. In a laboratory setting, such con-
ditions can be satisﬁed and we can design trust management systems that realize
the goal of fairness, even in the presence of adversaries.
The theory of equity allows for the existence of solutions that satisfy multiple
constraints, and are considered equitably eﬃcient if no other solution dominates
them in terms of the equitable preference relation. Therefore, even when agents’
utilities are the result of their operations on a market with diﬀerent resources and
capabilities, but all agents act fairly, then the resulting distribution of utilities may
be equitably eﬃcient.
Yet the question remains how fairness can be achieved by a trust management
system in a realistic environment where agents are not expected to act fairly. The
two concepts of fairness, individual agent fairness and fairness of a trust management
system, seem to be related. If the trust management system will increase trust as
a direct consequence of fair agent behavior, it should be able to realize its own
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system goal of fairness. If traders in an Internet auction house can only increase
their reputation as a result of fair behavior (for example, if all transactions are
supervised by impartial, omniscient arbiters), then the trust management system
will be perfectly fair - the distribution of agent utilities should be aﬀected only
by legitimate factors. Of course, the real challenge lies in the design of such trust
management systems.
Therefore, the fairness of a trust management system in a realistic setting should
be an emergent property that depends on the fairness of individual agents. The trust
management system should provide incentives for fair agent behavior. Notice that
this is also possible in the case of a trust management system that does not use
centralized control and global information. For example, a Peer-to-peer ﬁle sharing
system that combats free-riding using trust management can also aim for fair treat-
ment of users, while it is impossible in such a system to maintain global information
and use centralized control. Global information is only used in a laboratory for the
evaluation of such a system. The system itself works based on local information
only.
Yet the main goal of trust management systems is the support of decisions
under uncertainty on the basis of justiﬁed trust. While this goal, and the previous
deﬁnitions of trust, are not contradictory to the consideration of fairness, they have
not before considered fairness explicitly. It seems necessary to go on to the next
question: what is the relationship between trust and fairness?
Let us recall the two main (simpliﬁed) deﬁnitions of trust used in literature:
Deﬁnition 5.1 Trust is a subjective, context-dependent expectation that an agent
will carry out a particular action in a situation of uncertainty. [2,3]
Deﬁnition 5.2 Trust is the degree of dependence on another agent that the trustee
is willing to accept in a situation of uncertainty, considering risks and incentives
involved. [4,5]
It has been pointed out in [1] that trust has yet another dimension: that of
norms, values, or principles of human agents. If an agent perceives that another
agent has high principles and acts in accordance with social norms, she is more
likely to trust him. This observation shows that trust can be aﬀected by the fair
behavior of agents.
Elgesem’s observation can be extended to non-human agents, because in many
cases, individual fairness can have computational models. This is the case when
the normative behavior of agents can be speciﬁed using contracts [15,16]. While in
some application domains expressing contracts might be diﬃcult, in other domains
it is quite simple. Consider the case of electronic games: there, fair behavior is
simply behavior that does not violate game rules. Trust management systems can
be used in such an application [17] and it is quite clear that the level of trust directly
depends on the fairness of an agent.
The exact relationship of trust and fairness requires further study in the areas
of psychology and social science. However, it seems that the question deserves more
attention from researchers in the ﬁeld. An interesting questions is whether ensuring
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fairness eliminates the need for trust. In other words, can a trust management
system be renamed as a ”fairness management system”? Is it possible to achieve
the goals of trust management without the use of trust? If not, then how should
trust be deﬁned if the goal of the trust management system is providing fairness?
Without claiming to have resolved the issue, we would like to open a discussion by
proposing two revised deﬁnitions of trust:
Deﬁnition 5.1a. Trust is a subjective, context-dependent expectation that an
agent will behave fairly with respect to my interests in a situation of uncertainty.
Deﬁnition 5.1b. Trust is the degree of dependence on another agent that the
trustee is willing to accept in a situation of uncertainty, considering risks, incentives
and the fairness of the trusted agent.
The issue of fairness has always been implicitly considered in the design and
evaluation of trust management systems. This paper has attempted to show that
an implicit consideration, using the utilitarian paradigm, is insuﬃcient. Considering
fairness explicitly leads to diﬀerent trust management system design and evaluation.
Trust management systems can realize a goal of system fairness, identiﬁed with
distributional fairness of agents’ utilities. The realization of this goal can be achieved
in a laboratory setting when all other factors that aﬀect utilities can be excluded,
and where we can test the system using modeled adversaries. In a realistic setting,
fairness may be an emergent property of trust management systems. In order to
support its emergence, the relationship between trust and fairness requires closer
study.
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